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Abstract
Temporal logics of knowledge are useful for reasoning about situations where the knowledge of an
agent or component is important, and where change in this knowledge may occur over time. Here we
use temporal logics of knowledge to reason about the game Cluedo. We show how to specify Cluedo
using temporal logics of knowledge and prove statements about the knowledge of the players using a
clausal resolution calculus for this logic. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using this
logic to specify and verify the game Cluedo and describe related implementations.
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1. Introduction
Temporal logics are useful for specifying dynamic systems that change over time. Log-
ics of knowledge are useful for specifying systems where statements such as if I know
that I hold card A then I know that you don’t hold card A are required. Together, temporal
logics of knowledge have been used where we require both dynamic aspects and informa-
tional aspects relating to knowledge. Temporal and/or knowledge logics have been used for
the specification and verification of distributed and multi-agent systems [1–3], analysing
security protocols [4,5], knowledge games such as the muddy children [6,7], etc.
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C. Dixon / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 50–78 51Cluedo® (Hasbro International Inc. [8]) is a board game where players gather infor-
mation about a murder. The suspects, murder weapons and room where the murder took
place are represented by playing cards. Three cards are secretly removed from the pack to
represent the murderer, the murder weapon and the location of the murder. The remaining
cards are shuffled and dealt to the players. Players attempt to find out the identity of the
murderer, murder weapon and location of the murder by the knowledge of their own cards,
and using knowledge obtained from cards revealed by other players during the game or
from statements that another player has no such card.
We show how the game can be specified using a temporal logic of knowledge and how
moves in the game correspond to additional knowledge for one or more of the players.
Using a simplified version of the game, we show how to prove certain inferences using a
resolution based approach. The contribution of the paper is a case study using temporal
logics of knowledge to represent and reason about the game Cluedo. In particular, we
demonstrate the suitability of this logic for specifying Cluedo and how to verify the derived
knowledge of players using a resolution calculus for this logic. Thus we show that temporal
logic of knowledge is a useful tool for specifying and reasoning about real world examples
and illustrate the use of a particular proof method for this logic on a reasonably sized
example. As an example, this will be useful for designers of proof methods for this and
related logics and for implementors of theorem provers for such logics.
The logic, KLn, we consider is the fusion of linear time temporal logic with finite past
and infinite future combined with the multi-agent epistemic logic S5 (see for example [6]
for more details about this logic). To prove that a particular property ϕ follows from a prob-
lem specification ψ , where both ϕ and ψ are formulae of KLn we must show  ψ ⇒ ϕ.
Here ψ represents the current situation in the game relating to the cards owned by a partic-
ular player and the knowledge gained from previous turns. As we use a refutation method
we prove that ψ ∧ ¬ϕ are unsatisfiable. We carry out proofs using resolution for tempo-
ral logics of knowledge [7,9]. This calculus uses, a translation to normal form to separate
the epistemic and temporal components, a resolution method applied to the temporal part
and resolution rules applied to the epistemic part. Information is carried between the two
components using clauses containing only literals.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the game Cluedo in more de-
tail and in Section 3 we give the syntax and semantics of KLn the temporal logic of knowl-
edge we use to specify and verify Cluedo. In Section 4 we show how moves in the game
can be specified in this logic. In Section 5 we give the resolution calculus for KLn which we
later use to prove properties that can be derived at different stages of the game. In Section 6
we show how to specify and verify Cluedo games using an example of a particular game.
A discussion of the suitability of this logic to specify and verify Cluedo is given in Sec-
tion 7. Player’s assistants that have been developed to keep track of knowledge in Cluedo
are described in Section 8 and conclusions and related work are mentioned in Section 9.
2. The game Cluedo
Cluedo is a board game where players gather information about a murder. The suspects,
murder weapons and room where the murder took place are represented by playing cards.
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envelope to represent the actual murderer, murder weapon and location of the murder. The
remaining cards are shuffled and dealt out to the players. Players take it in turns to make
suggestions, a triple: suspect, weapon and room. If the player to their left (the answering
player) has one of these cards it is shown secretly to the player making the suggestion.
The other players can see a card has been shown to the player making the suggestion but
do not know its identity. If the answering player holds more than one of the cards in the
suggestion then only one card is shown to the suggesting player, chosen by the answering
player. If the answering player does not hold one of the three cards in the suggestion, she
declares this and the player to her left becomes the answering player and must try and show
the suggesting player one of the cards. This continues until a card has been shown to the
suggesting player or no card has been shown by any player for this suggestion. Players use
the knowledge about the cards in their hand and knowledge about cards other players may
or may not hold to eliminate suspects, weapons and rooms from their enquiries. When a
player knows the murderer, murder weapon, and room she makes an accusation, again a
suspect, weapon, room triple, and checks the hidden murder cards. If she is correct she wins
the game. Otherwise she takes no further part in the game (i.e., cannot make suggestions
and accusations) but does answer the suggestions of other players. Note that, whilst each
player makes many suggestions during a game, at most one accusation is made by each
player during a game so the player should be certain about the murderer, weapon and
location before making an accusation.
The commercial version of the game is produced by Hasbro [8] and involves a board
which represents the rooms in the house and access between them. The players are repre-
sented on the board using coloured pieces, one for each of the suspects. Movement about
the board is done by rolling a dice and the player moves their piece that number of squares
towards a room. A turn consists of rolling the dice and moving (or staying in the current
room), making a suggestion (if the player’s piece is in or has reached a room) and making
an accusation (if the player feels she knows who the murderer, weapon and location of the
murder is). The coloured piece of a player must be in a particular room before they can
make a suggestion involving that room. Also the coloured piece representing the relevant
suspect in the suggestion is moved from its current position on the board into the room
involved in the suggestion.
There are six suspects: Col. Mustard (yellow); Prof. Plum (purple); Rev. Green (green);
Mrs Peacock (blue); Miss Scarlett (red); Mrs White (white); six weapons: dagger; candle-
stick; revolver; rope; lead piping; spanner; and nine rooms: lounge; conservatory; dining
room; study; ballroom; kitchen; hall; billiard room; library. However there are different
versions of the game with slightly different weapons and rooms and with small differences
to the rules.
As we are interested primarily in the changes in knowledge we simplify the game and
do not consider the aspects relating to the board, dice and movement around the board.
Hence when it is their turn a player can make a suggestion (a triple: suspect, weapon and
room) involving any room rather than just the room their coloured playing piece happens
to be in on the board.
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The logic, KLn, a temporal logic of knowledge we consider is the fusion of proposi-
tional linear-time temporal logic (PLTL) with multi-agent S5. We first give the syntax and
semantics of KLn, where each relation in the epistemic logic is restricted to be an equiva-
lence relation [10]. The temporal component is interpreted over a discrete linear model of
time with finite past and infinite future; an obvious choice for such a flow of time is (N,<),
i.e., natural numbers ordered by the usual ‘less than’ relation. This logic has been studied
in detail [10] and is the most commonly used temporal logic of knowledge.
3.1. Syntax
Formulae are constructed from a set P = {p,q, r, . . .} of primitive propositions. The
language KLn contains the standard propositional connectives ¬ (not), ∨ (or), ∧ (and) and
⇒ (implies). For knowledge we assume a set of agents Ag = {1, . . . n} and introduce a
set of unary modal connectives Ki , for i ∈ Ag, where a formula Kiφ is read as “agent i
knows φ”. For the temporal dimension we take the usual [11] set of future-time temporal
connectives © (next), ♦ (sometime or eventually), (always), U (until) and W (unless
or weak until).
The set of well-formed formulae of KLn, WFFK is defined as follows:
• false, true and any element of P is in WFFK ;
• if A and B are in WFFK then so are (where i ∈ Ag)
¬A A∨B A∧B A ⇒ B KiA♦A A AUB AWB ©A
We define some particular classes of formulae that will be useful later.
Definition 1. A literal is either p, or ¬p, where p ∈ P .
Definition 2. A modal literal is either Kil or ¬Kil where l is a literal and i ∈ Ag.
Notation: in the following, l are literals, m are either literals or modal literals and D are
disjunctions of literals or modal literals.
3.2. Semantics
Definition 3. A timeline f , is an infinitely long, linear, discrete sequence of points, indexed
by the natural numbers. Let TLines be the set of all timelines.
Definition 4. A point q , is a pair q = (f,u), where f ∈ TLines is a timeline and u ∈N is a
temporal index into f . Let Points be the set of all points.
Definition 5. A valuation π , is a function π : Points ×P → {T ,F }.
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• TL ⊆ TLines is a set of timelines, with a distinguished timeline f0;
• Ri , for all i ∈ Ag is the agent accessibility relation over Points, i.e., Ri ⊆ Points ×
Points where each Ri is an equivalence relation;
• π is a valuation.
As usual, we define the semantics of the language via the satisfaction relation ‘|=’.
For KLn, this relation holds between pairs of the form 〈M,p〉 (where M is a model and p
is a point in TL × N), and formulae in WFFK . The rules defining the satisfaction relation
are given below.
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= true
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= false
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= p iff π((f,u),p)= T (where p ∈ P)
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= ¬A iff 〈M,(f,u)〉 |=A
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= A∨B iff 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= A or 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= B
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= ©A iff 〈M,(f,u+ 1)〉 |= A
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= A iff ∀u′ ∈N, if (u u′) then 〈M,(f,u′)〉 |= A
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= ♦A iff ∃u′ ∈N such that (u u′) and 〈M,(f,u′)〉 |= A
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= AUB iff ∃u′ ∈N such that (u′  u) and
〈
M,(f,u′)
〉 |= B, and ∀u′′ ∈N,
if (u u′′ < u′) then
〈
M,(f,u′′)
〉 |= A
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= AWB iff 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= AUB or 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= A
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= KiA iff ∀f ′ ∈ T L. ∀u′ ∈N. if
(
(f,u), (f ′, u′)
) ∈ Ri
then
〈
M,(f ′, u′)
〉 |= A
For any formula A, if there is some model M and timeline f0 such that 〈M,(f0,0)〉 |= A,
then A is said to be satisfiable. If for any formula A, for all models M there exists a
timeline f0 such that 〈M,(f0,0)〉 |= A then A is said to be valid. Note that, this is the
anchored version of the (temporal) logic, i.e., validity and satisfiability are evaluated at the
beginning of time (see for example [12]).
As agent accessibility relations in KLn models are equivalence relations, the axioms of
the normal modal system S5 (see below), are valid in KLn models.
K: Ki(ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (Kiϕ ⇒ Kiψ)
T : Kiϕ ⇒ ϕ (reflexivity)
D: Kiϕ ⇒ ¬Ki¬ϕ (seriality)
B: ¬Ki¬Kiϕ ⇒ ϕ (symmetry)
4: Kiϕ ⇒ KiKiϕ (transitivity)
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The system S5 is widely recognised as the logic of idealised knowledge, and for this reason
KLn is often termed a temporal logic of knowledge.
Note that, the KLn logic does not include operators for everyone knows (E) or common
knowledge (C). However, as these are discussed later we mention them here. Everybody
knows, E, is defined as Eφ ⇔∧i∈Ag Kiφ and the common knowledge operator, C, is then
defined as the maximal fixpoint of the formula Cφ ⇔ E(φ ∧ Cφ), i.e., everyone knows φ
and everyone knows that everyone knows φ and . . . , etc.
4. Specifying a Cluedo game
We assume that the players are rational and that they can see the moves and hear the
statements made by other players. First, we will reduce the number of cards in the game
to make the following specification easier to read. We reduce the number of suspects and
weapons to four each and have no rooms at all. Let us assume that we have simply four
suspects (Prof. Plum, Rev. Green, Col. Mustard and Miss Scarlett), four weapons (lead
piping, spanner, revolver and rope) and no rooms. It is easy to scale this up to the full num-
ber of suspects, weapons and rooms. In our example we assume three players Catherine,
Wendy and Jane. The changes in knowledge relating to moves in Cluedo have previously
been described in [13] but using a different logic (the combination of dynamic logic and a
modal logic of knowledge allowing common knowledge).
Let the set of players Ag = {c,w, j}. First we use propositions to show who holds each
of the cards, where i ∈ {c,w, j}.
• ri is true if player i holds Miss Scarlett
• gi is true if player i holds Rev Green
• yi is true if player i holds Col. Mustard
• bi is true if player i holds Prof. Plum
• li is true if player i holds lead piping
• si is true if player i holds spanner
• vi is true if player i holds revolver
• pi is true if player i holds rope
A suspect is denoted as the murderer, or a weapon as the murder weapon by having m as a
suffix.
• rm is true if Miss Scarlett is the murderer
• gm is true if Rev Green is the murderer
• ym is true if Col. Mustard is the murderer
• bm is true if Prof. Plum is the murderer
• lm is true if lead piping is the murder weapon
• sm is true if spanner is the murder weapon
• vm is true if revolver is the murder weapon
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At the start of the game. Initially (and throughout the game) one of the suspects must be
the murderer
(rm ∨ gm ∨ ym ∨ bm)
and one of the weapons is the murder weapon
(lm ∨ sm ∨ vm ∨ pm).
Each player knows this information i ∈ {c,w, j}
Ki(rm ∨ gm ∨ ym ∨ bm)
Ki(lm ∨ sm ∨ vm ∨ pm)
and they know that other players know this, etc. (i.e., it is common knowledge).
Initially (and throughout the game) each card must be held by one of the players or it
must be the murderer or murder weapon. For example for Miss Scarlett
rc ∨ rw ∨ rj ∨ rm
and similarly for the other suspects and weapons. As before each player knows this and
knows that other players know this, etc. (i.e., it is common knowledge).
If a player holds a card then the other players don’t hold it and it can’t be the murderer
or murder weapon. If a card is the murder suspect or weapon then none of the players can
hold that card.
rc ⇒ (¬rw ∧ ¬rj ∧ ¬rm)
rw ⇒ (¬rc ∧ ¬rj ∧ ¬rm)
rj ⇒ (¬rw ∧ ¬rc ∧ ¬rm)
rm ⇒ (¬rw ∧ ¬rj ∧ ¬rc)
Again this is known by each player and that other players know this, etc. (i.e., it is common
knowledge).
After the deal. After the deal, each player knows they hold the cards that they have been
dealt and knows that they don’t hold the cards they haven’t been dealt. For example if
Catherine is dealt Miss Scarlett and Rev. Green then
Kcrc ∧Kcgc ∧Kc¬yc ∧Kc¬bc ∧Kc¬lc ∧Kc¬sc ∧Kc¬vc ∧Kc¬pc
After a suggestion. If Catherine makes the suggestion “Miss Scarlett and the lead piping”,
then there are two options, either the next player does not have one of these cards or the
next player has one of these cards and shows her a card. Let us assume that Wendy first
tries to answer the suggestion.
For the former, i.e., Wendy does not hold Miss Scarlett or the lead piping, Wendy states
that she does not hold them for all to hear. From this the statements ¬rw and ¬lw become
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both learnt this information.
Kc¬rw ∧Kc¬lw
Kj¬rw ∧Kj¬lw
For the latter, i.e., Wendy holds one of Miss Scarlett or the lead piping, Wendy passes
a card to Catherine such that all the players can see her doing this but the identity of the
card being passed remains a secret. Only Catherine (and of course Wendy) gets to know
the identity of the card Wendy passes. Thus several inferences can be made. Firstly that
Wendy holds Miss Scarlett or the lead piping is known to each player, i.e., i ∈ {c,w, j}
Ki(rw ∨ lw)
in particular Jane knows this, i.e.,
Kj(rw ∨ lw)
and this again is common knowledge. Also Catherine learns the identity of one of the cards
Wendy holds (say it is the lead piping), i.e.,
Kclw
Further, Wendy knows Catherine know this, etc.
Lastly, if a player (say Catherine) makes a suggestion (for example Miss Scarlett and
the lead piping), all the other players state they do not hold one of these cards and the
suggesting player, Catherine, does not make an accusation, each player then knows that
Catherine must hold either Miss Scarlett or the lead piping, i.e., i ∈ {c,w, j}
Ki(rc ∨ lc)
This is again common knowledge.
The end of the game. The game ends when one of the players know the murderer and the
murder weapon, i.e.,
Ki(xm ∧ zm)
where i ∈ {c,w, j} and x is one of r, g, y, b and z is one of l, s, v,p.
Dealing with time and knowledge. We assume that each element of the game where the
knowledge changes occurs at the next time point. For example we assume that before the
cards are dealt is time zero, the deal occurs at time one, the first time a suggestion is
answered is at time two etc. At time point zero, before the deal has occurred, we assume
that the players have information about the cards, i.e., who are the possible suspects and
the weapons, that one of the suspects must be the murderer and one of the weapons must
be the murder weapon, that someone must hold each card or it must be the murderer or
murder weapon etc. as described in the “At the Start of the Game” section.
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do not forget this information, i.e.,
(1)Kixk ⇒ ©Kixk and Ki¬xk ⇒ ©Ki¬xk
where i ∈ {c,w, j}, k ∈ {c,w, j,m} and x ∈ {r, g, y, b, l, s, v,p}. That is if a player knows
that someone holds (does not hold) a card then in the next moment they know that person
holds (does not hold) that card, i.e., players don’t forget knowledge relating to holding
cards. Similarly, as players can learn another player holds either of two cards, we also
require
(2)Ki(xk ∨ zk) ⇒ ©Ki(xk ∨ zk)
where i ∈ {c,w, j}, k ∈ {c,w, j,m} and x, z ∈ {r, g, y, b, l, s, v,p}. Further, if we require
reasoning about knowledge we may require similar axioms where is Ki is replaced by a
series of K operators where for each adjacent pair of modal operators Ki and Kh i = h (as
KiKiϕ ≡ Kiϕ in S5).
Similarly, if a particular player knows who holds (or does not hold) a card then we
assume the player knows its always the case that the card is (not) held by that person.
(3)Kixk ⇒ Ki xk and Ki¬xk ⇒ Ki ¬xk
where i ∈ {c,w, j}, k ∈ {c,w, j,m} and x ∈ {r, g, y, b, l, s, v,p}. As above we will also
need related axioms about knowing either of two cards
(4)Ki(xk ∨ zk) ⇒ Ki (xk ∨ zk)
where i ∈ {c,w, j}, k ∈ {c,w, j,m} and x, z ∈ {r, g, y, b, l, s, v,p}. Also similarly to the
above we may need knowledge about knowledge of cards. This group of axioms models
the fact that the players don’t change the cards that they hold as the game progresses and
that the players know this.
Common knowledge. Statements for example “at time two Wendy answers she doesn’t
hold Miss Scarlett or the lead piping” imply that Wendy not holding these cards is common
knowledge. We would like to write something like t2 ⇒ C(¬rw ∧ ¬lw) where t2 is a new
proposition which holds at time two and C is the common knowledge operator. As we
do not have the common knowledge operator C in our language we must explicitly state
(one or more) knowledge operators. That is we must explicitly state the depth of modal
operators we require. We will see an example of this in Section 6 obtaining clauses 44–47.
The depth of nesting of knowledge operators we need to incorporate is discussed further in
Section 7.
5. Resolution for temporal logics of knowledge
The resolution calculus is clausal requiring a translation to a normal form to separate
epistemic and temporal components and to put formulae in a particular form. A set of
temporal resolution rules are applied to the temporal part and resolution rules are applied
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containing literals. Full details of resolution based proof methods for temporal logics of
knowledge are given in [7,9].
5.1. Normal form
Formulae in KLn can be transformed into a normal form SNFK (Separated Normal
Form for temporal logics of knowledge) [7,9]. For the purposes of the normal form we in-
troduce a symbol start such that for all M , 〈M,(f0,0)〉 |= start. The translation to SNFK
removes many of the temporal operators that do not appear in the normal form by rewrit-
ing using their fixpoint definitions. Also the translation uses the renaming technique [14]
where complex subformulae are replaced by new propositions and the truth value of these
propositions is linked to the formulae they replaced in all reachable states. To achieve this
we introduce the ∗ operator with the following semantics.
〈
M,(f,u)
〉 |= ∗A iff 〈M,(f ′, u′)〉 |= A
for every point (f ′, u′) reachable from (f,u) where reachability is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let M be a KLn-model and (f,u), (f ′, u′) be points in M . Then (f ′, u′) is
reachable from (f,u) iff either: (i) f = f ′ and u′  u; (ii) ((f,u), (f ′, u′)) ∈ Ri for some
agent i ∈ Ag; or (iii) there exists some point (f ′′, u′′) in M such that (f ′′, u′′) is reachable
from (f,u) and (f ′, u′) is reachable from (f ′′, u′′).
Thus the ∗ operator is the universal operator and ∗ϕ denotes that ϕ holds in each
reachable world.
Thus we reason about reachable points from the initial point in the distinguished time-
line f0 (where start is satisfiable), i.e., the points we require in the proof.
5.1.1. Definition of the normal form
Formulae in SNFK are of the general form
∗∧
j
Tj
where each Tj , known as a clause, must be in one of the varieties described in Fig. 1
where ka , lb , and l are literals and mib are either literals, or modal literals involving the Ki
operator. Thus a Ki clause (also known as a modal clause) may not contain modal literals
Kil1 and Kj l2 (or Kil1 and ¬Kj l2) where i = j . Each Ki clause involves literals, or modal
literals involving the Ki operator where at least one of the disjuncts is a modal literal. The
outer ‘ ∗’ operator and conjunction that surrounds the clauses is usually omitted and we
consider just the set of clauses Tj .
5.1.2. Translation to normal form
The translation to SNFK is carried out by renaming complex subformulae with new
propositional variables and linking the truth of the subformula to that of the proposition
at all moments. Temporal operators are removed using their fixpoint definitions. Classical
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r∨
b=1
lb (an initial clause)
g∧
a=1
ka ⇒ ©
r∨
b=1
lb (a step clause)
g∧
a=1
ka ⇒ ♦l (a sometime clause)
true ⇒
r∨
b=1
mib (a Ki -clause)
true ⇒
r∨
b=1
lb (a literal clause)
Fig. 1. Clauses in SNFK .
and temporal equivalences (see for example [12]) are also used to rewrite formulae into the
correct format. See [7,15] for more details.
We illustrate the translation into SNFK by means of an example. Assume we want to
translate
© ¬Kwrc
(from the next moment onwards, its always the case that Wendy doesn’t know that Cather-
ine holds Miss Scarlett) into SNFK . First we rename the formula by a new propositional
variable (say t0) and anchor t0 to the initial moment in time obtaining the following.
start ⇒ t0 t0 ⇒ © ¬Kwrc
Next we rename ¬Kwrc by a new propositional variable, t1 obtaining
start ⇒ t0 t1 ⇒ ¬Kwrc
t0 ⇒ © t1
¬Kwrc is renamed by a new propositional variable n0
start ⇒ t0 t1 ⇒ n0
t0 ⇒ © t1 n0 ⇒ ¬Kwrc
and the always operator is removed as follows.
1. start ⇒ t0 4. n0 ⇒ ¬Kwrc
2. t0 ⇒ © t1 5. n1 ⇒ ©n1
3. t1 ⇒ n1 6. n1 ⇒ n0
The third, fourth and final clauses can be rewritten using standard transformations as fol-
lows.
3. true ⇒ ¬t1 ∨ n1 6. true ⇒ ¬n1 ∨ n0
4. true ⇒ ¬n ∨ ¬K r0 w c
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pects must be the murderer”, i.e., (rm ∨ gm ∨ ym ∨ bm) we want these to hold at every
reachable state. This is because they should be true at every moment in time and each
agent should know they hold and each agent should know they know etc. Hence we can
write them directly into the normal form as true ⇒ (rm ∨ gm ∨ ym ∨ bm). This exploits the
semantics of the ∗ operator surrounding the clauses. However we cannot achieve this for
statements like “at time 2 its common knowledge that Wendy doesn’t hold Miss Scarlett”,
i.e., ©©C¬sw . See Section 7 for further discussion of this issue.
5.2. Resolution rules
The resolution rules presented are split into four groups: those concerned with initial
resolution, modal resolution, step resolution and temporal resolution. As well as the reso-
lution rules presented, simplification and subsumption also takes place. So for example the
step clause a ⇒ © (b ∨ b ∨ c) is automatically rewritten as a ⇒ © (b ∨ c).
Initial resolution An initial clause may be resolved with either a literal clause or an initial
clause as follows
[IRES1]
true ⇒ (A∨ l)
start ⇒ (B ∨ ¬l)
start ⇒ (A∨B)
[IRES2]
start ⇒ (A∨ l)
start ⇒ (B ∨ ¬l)
start ⇒ (A∨B)
Modal resolution During modal resolution we apply the following rules. In the following
we may only resolve two Ki clauses together if they relate to the same i, i.e., we may not
resolve a clause containing K1 with a clause containing K2. We may also resolve a Ki
clause with a literal clause.
[MRES1]
true ⇒ D ∨m
true ⇒ D′ ∨ ¬m
true ⇒ D ∨D′
[MRES2]
true ⇒ D ∨Kil
true ⇒ D′ ∨Ki¬l
true ⇒ D ∨D′
[MRES3]
true ⇒ D ∨Kil
true ⇒ D′ ∨ ¬l
true ⇒ D ∨D′
[MRES4]
true ⇒ D ∨ ¬Kil
true ⇒ D′ ∨ l
true ⇒ D ∨ modi (D′)
Definition 7. The function modi (D), defined on disjunctions of literals or modal literals D,
is defined as follows:
modi (A∨B) = modi (A)∨ modi (B) modi (Kil) = Kil
modi (l) = ¬Ki¬l modi (¬Kil) = ¬Kil
Finally, we require the following rewrite rule to allow us to obtain the most comprehen-
sive set of literal clauses for use during initial, step and temporal resolution
[MRES5] true ⇒ L∨Kil1 ∨Kil2 ∨ · · ·
true ⇒ L∨ l ∨ l ∨ · · ·1 2
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Step resolution ‘Step’ resolution involves the application of the following resolution rules
relating to the next operator, where SRES1 is applied to two step clauses and SRES2 is
applied to a literal clause and a step clause.
[SRES1]
P ⇒ © (A∨ l)
Q ⇒ © (B ∨ ¬l)
(P ∧Q) ⇒ © (A∨B)
[SRES2]
true ⇒ (A∨ l)
Q ⇒ © (B ∨ ¬l)
Q ⇒ © (A∨B)
Once a contradiction within a state is found, the following rule can be used to generate
additional literal clauses.
[SRES3] P ⇒ © false
true ⇒ ¬P
Termination Each cycle of initial, modal or step resolution terminates when either no new
resolvents are derived, or false is derived in the form of either start ⇒ false or true ⇒
false.
Temporal resolution The temporal resolution rule is as follows, where we resolve a some-
time clause, Q ⇒ ♦l, with a condition, ∨nk=0 Ak , that implies ¬l in the next moment
(known as a loop formula for ¬l).
[TRES]
∨n
k=0 Ak ⇒ © ¬l
Q ⇒ ♦l
Q ⇒ (∧ni=0 ¬Ai)Wl
The resolvent needs to be further translated into the normal form.
5.3. The temporal resolution algorithm
Given any temporal formula ψ to be shown unsatisfiable the following steps are per-
formed.
(1) Translate ψ into a set of SNFK clauses ψs .
(2) Perform modal and step resolution (including simplification and subsumption) until
either
(a) true ⇒ false is derived—terminate noting ψ unsatisfiable; or
(b) no new resolvents are generated—continue to step 3.
(3) Select an eventuality from the right-hand side of a sometime clause within ψs , for
example ♦l. Search for loop formulae in ¬l and generate the appropriate resolvents.
If no new formulae have been generated try the next sometime clause otherwise (if
new formulae have been generated) go to step 4. If there are no eventualities for which
new resolvents can be derived, go to step 5.
(4) Add the new resolvents to the clause-set and perform initial resolution until either
(a) start ⇒ false is derived—terminate noting ψ unsatisfiable; or
C. Dixon / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 50–78 63(b) no new resolvents are generated—continue at step 2.
(5) Perform initial resolution until either
(a) start ⇒ false is derived—terminate noting ψ unsatisfiable; or
(b) no new resolvents are generated—terminate declaring ψ satisfiable.
5.4. Correctness
Theorem 8 [7,9,15]. A KLn formula A is satisfiable if, and only if, τ0[A] is satisfiable
(where τ0 is the translation into SNFK ).
Theorem 9 [7,9] (Soundness). Let S be a satisfiable set of SNFK clauses and T be the set
of rules obtained from S by an application of one of the resolution rules. Then T is also
satisfiable.
Theorem 10 [7,9] (Completeness). If a set of SNFK rules is unsatisfiable then it has a
refutation by the resolution procedure for KLn.
6. Verification using clausal resolution
In the following, clauses involving the specification of a particular run of the game
are labelled 1,2,3, . . . whereas clauses from the formula being proved are denoted
C1,C2,C3, . . . . First we write the information held prior to the deal as clauses. As they
are axioms we write them directly in the normal form (and hold at all moments in time).
1. true ⇒ (rm ∨ gm ∨ ym ∨ bm) 9. true ⇒ (vc ∨ vw ∨ vj ∨ vm)
2. true ⇒ (lm ∨ sm ∨ vm ∨ pm) 10. true ⇒ (pc ∨ pw ∨ pj ∨ pm)
3. true ⇒ (rc ∨ rw ∨ rj ∨ rm) 11. true ⇒ (¬rc ∨ ¬rw)
4. true ⇒ (gc ∨ gw ∨ gj ∨ gm) 12. true ⇒ (¬rc ∨ ¬rj )
5. true ⇒ (yc ∨ yw ∨ yj ∨ ym) 13. true ⇒ (¬rc ∨ ¬rm)
6. true ⇒ (bc ∨ bw ∨ bj ∨ bm) 14. true ⇒ (¬rw ∨ ¬rj )
7. true ⇒ (lc ∨ lw ∨ lj ∨ lm) 15. true ⇒ (¬rw ∨ ¬rm)
8. true ⇒ (sc ∨ sw ∨ sj ∨ sm) 16. true ⇒ (¬rj ∨ ¬rm)
Clause 1 states that at least one person is the murderer and clause 2 states that at least one
of the weapons is the murder weapon. Clause 3 states that the card Miss Scarlett must be
held by either Catherine, Wendy or Jane or Miss Scarlett must be the murderer. Clauses 4–
10 are similar to clause 3 for each other card. Clauses 11–16 state that if a particular person
holds the card Miss Scarlett then the other players cannot hold it and Miss Scarlett cannot
be the murderer, or if Miss Scarlett is the murderer then none of the players can hold Miss
Scarlett. There are additional versions of 11–16 for each card that we haven’t written out
above. In the following proofs if we use a version of one of these clauses for another card
e.g. the g version of 13, i.e., true ⇒ (¬gc ∨ ¬gm) we denote this as 13(g). These come
from translating the axioms from the At the Start of the Game section into SNFK .
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Player Catherine Wendy Jane MurderHand
Cards Miss Scarlett Revolver Col. Mustard Lead Piping
Rev Green Rope Spanner Prof. Plum
Thus from the above the following holds
© (Kcrc ∧Kcgc ∧Kc¬yc ∧Kc¬bc ∧Kc¬lc ∧Kc¬sc ∧Kc¬vc ∧Kc¬pc
∧Kw¬rw ∧Kw¬gw ∧Kw¬yw ∧Kw¬bw ∧Kw¬lw ∧Kw¬sw ∧Kwvw ∧Kwpw
(5)∧Kj¬rj ∧Kj¬gj ∧Kjyj ∧Kj¬bj ∧Kj¬lj ∧Kjsj ∧Kj¬vj ∧Kj¬pj )
Writing this into the normal form we obtain,
17. start ⇒ t0 30. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kw¬bw)
18. t0 ⇒ © t1 31. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kw¬lw)
19. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kcrc) 32. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kw¬sw)
20. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kcgc) 33. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kwvw)
21. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kc¬yc) 34. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kwpw)
22. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kc¬bc) 35. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kj¬rj )
23. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kc¬lc) 36. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kj¬gj )
24. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kc¬sc) 37. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kjyj )
25. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kc¬vc) 38. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kj¬bj )
26. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kc¬pc) 39. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kj¬lj )
27. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kw¬rw) 40. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kjsj )
28. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kw¬gw) 41. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kj¬vj )
29. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kw¬yw) 42. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨Kj¬pj )
where t0 and t1 are new propositional variables and t0 renames (5) and t1 renames the
conjunction of modal literals in the scope of the next operator in (5). Intuitively t0 holds at
time 0 and t1 holds at time 1 respectively which are enforced by clauses 17 and 18. At this
point we should be able to prove, for example, that at time one Catherine knows that Miss
Scarlett is not the murderer. This is symbolised as
©Kc¬rm
Thus the above clauses in addition to the clausal form of
¬©Kc¬rm
(which is equivalent to ©¬Kc¬rm) should give us a contradiction. To make the problem
smaller we reuse the new propositions t0 and t1 (and clauses 17, 18). Alternatively we
could add two additional new propositions one renaming ¬©Kc¬rm and one renaming
¬Kc¬rm producing clauses analogous to 17, 18 and with C1 containing the second of
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C1.¬t1 ∨ ¬Kc¬rm
and using resolution obtain a contradiction as follows.
C2. true ⇒ ¬t1 ∨ ¬Kcrc [C1,13 MRES4]
C3. true ⇒ ¬t1 [C2,19 MRES1]
C4. t0 ⇒ © false [C3,18 SRES2]
C5. true ⇒ ¬t0 [C4 SRES3]
C6. start ⇒ false [C5,17 IRES1]
That is if Φ = ∗∧i Ti where
∧
i Ti is the conjunction of clauses 1–42 then  Φ ⇒©Kc¬rm. At this point we can also prove that the lead piping is the murder weapon (i.e.,
© lm) and Prof. Plum is the murderer (i.e., ©bm).
Let us assume (at time two) that Catherine makes the suggestion “Miss Scarlett and
the lead piping”. Therefore after consulting her cards Wendy answers no, i.e., we add the
formulae
©© (Ki¬rw ∧Ki¬lw)
for i ∈ {c, j,w}. Trying to answer the suggestion then passes to Jane. She also answers no.
Thus we may add the formulae
©© (Ki¬rj ∧Ki¬lj )
for i ∈ {c, j,w}. Thus together we obtain
©© (Ki¬rw ∧Ki¬lw ∧Ki¬rj ∧Ki¬lj )
Again reusing t0, t1 and clauses 17, 18 instead of adding new propositions to rename
©© (Ki¬rw ∧Ki¬lw ∧Ki¬rj ∧Ki¬lj ) and © (Ki¬rw ∧Ki¬lw ∧Ki¬rj ∧Ki¬lj ) we
obtain the following where t2 is a new proposition renaming (Ki¬rw ∧Ki¬lw ∧Ki¬rj ∧
Ki¬lj ).
43. t1 ⇒ © t2
44. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨Ki¬rw
45. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨Ki¬lw
46. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨Ki¬rj
47. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨Ki¬lj
As both Wendy and Jane have neither of these cards and Catherine doesn’t make an accu-
sation they (and Catherine) know Catherine must hold one of these cards, i.e.,
©© (Ki(rc ∨ lc))
for i ∈ {c, j,w}. This is written into normal form as
48. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨Kin0
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where n0 is a new proposition renaming rc ∨ lc and we reuse t2 as before.
At this point Catherine should also be able to deduce that the lead piping is the murder
weapon, i.e., ©©Kclm. We negate and prove this via resolution (reusing propositions t0,
t1, t2).
C7. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬Kclm
C8. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj [C7,7 MRES4]
C9. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lj [C8,45(c) MRES1]
C10. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc [C9,47(c) MRES1]
To complete the proof we need to use the following axiom (see dealing with time)
Kc¬lc ⇒ ©Kc¬lc
We rewrite into the normal form by first writing as a disjunction
¬Kc¬lc ∨ ©Kc¬lc
and then rename ¬Kc¬lc by ¬a and then Kc¬lc by d
¬Kc¬lc ∨ a
a ⇒ ©d
¬d ∨Kc¬lc
resulting in the following clauses.
50. true ⇒ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ a
51. a ⇒ ©d
52. true ⇒ ¬d ∨Kc¬lc
The remainder of the proof being as follows.
C11. true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬d [C10,52 MRES1]
C12. a ⇒ ©¬t2 [51,C11 SRES2]
C13. a ∧ t1 ⇒ © false [43,C12 SRES1]
C14. true ⇒ ¬a ∨ ¬t1 [C13 SRES3]
C15. true ⇒ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬t1 [50,C14 MRES1]
C16. true ⇒ ¬t1 [23,C15 MRES1]
C17. t0 ⇒ © false [18,C16 SRES2]
C18. true ⇒ ¬t0 [C17 SRES3]
C19. start ⇒ false [17,C18 IRES1]
Next Wendy makes a suggestion. At time three Wendy suggests the lead piping and Col.
Mustard. Jane shows Wendy Col. Mustard. Thus at time three Wendy knows Jane holds
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Col. Mustard ©©©Kc(lj ∨yj ). We write these statements into the normal form (reusing
the propositions t0, t1, t2) where n1 is a new proposition renaming lj ∨ yj .
53. t2 ⇒ © t3
54. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨Kwyj
55. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨Kcn1
56. true ⇒ ¬n1 ∨ lj ∨ yj
At this point Catherine can deduce both the murderer and the murder weapon, i.e.,
©©©Kc(lm ∧ bm). We shall again prove this with resolution. We negate obtaining
¬©©©Kc(lm ∧ bm) which is equivalent to ©©©¬Kc¬(¬lm ∨ ¬bm) from which
clauses C20 and C21 are derived. Then we prove this via resolution (reusing proposi-
tions t0, t1, t2 and t3) where n2 is a new proposition renaming ¬lm ∨ ¬bm.
C20. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬n2
C21. true ⇒ ¬n2 ∨ ¬lm ∨ ¬bm
C22. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kclm ∨ ¬Kcbm [C20,C21 MRES4]
C23. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj ∨ ¬Kcbm [C22,7 MRES4]
C24. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬Kc¬rm ∨ ¬Kc¬gm ∨ ¬Kc¬ym [C23,1 MRES4]
C25. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬Kc¬gm ∨ ¬Kc¬ym [C24,13 MRES4]
C26. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬Kcgc ∨ ¬Kc¬ym [C25,13(g) MRES4]
C27. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬Kcgc ∨ ¬Kcyj [C26,16(y) MRES4]
C28. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬Kcgc ∨ ¬Kcn1 [C27,56 MRES4]
C29. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬Kcgc [C28,55 MRES1]
In the proof we need clauses (see dealing with time) from the normal form of the following.
Kc¬lw ⇒ ©Kc¬lw
Kc¬lj ⇒ ©Kc¬lj
Kcrc ⇒ ©Kcrc
Kcgc ⇒ ©Kcgc
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57. true ⇒ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ a1 63. true ⇒ ¬Kcrc ∨ a3
58. a1 ⇒ ©d1 64. a3 ⇒ ©d3
59. true ⇒ ¬d1 ∨Kc¬lw 65. true ⇒ ¬d3 ∨Kcrc
60. true ⇒ ¬Kc¬lj ∨ a2 66. true ⇒ ¬Kcgc ∨ a4
61. a2 ⇒ ©d2 67. a4 ⇒ ©d4
62. true ⇒ ¬d2 ∨Kc¬lj 68. true ⇒ ¬d4 ∨Kcgc
The proof continues as follows.
C30. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬d4 [C29,68 MRES1]
C31. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj
∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4 [C30,65 MRES1]
C32. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬d2 ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4 [C31,62 MRES1]
C33. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬d1 ∨ ¬d2 ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4 [C32,59 MRES1]
C34. true ⇒ ¬t3 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬d1 ∨ ¬d2 ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4 [C33,52 MRES1]
C35. t2 ⇒ © (¬d ∨ ¬d1 ∨ ¬d2 ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4) [C34,53 SRES2]
C36. (t2 ∧ a) ⇒ © (¬d1 ∨ ¬d2 ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4) [C35,51 SRES1]
C37. (t2 ∧ a ∧ a1) ⇒ © (¬d2 ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4) [C36,58 SRES1]
C38. (t2 ∧ a ∧ a1 ∧ a2) ⇒ © (¬d3 ∨ ¬d4) [C37,61 SRES1]
C39. (t2 ∧ a ∧ a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3) ⇒ ©¬d4 [C38,64 SRES1]
C40. (t2 ∧ a ∧ a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3 ∧ a4) ⇒ © false [C39,67 SRES1]
C41. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬a1 ∨ ¬a2 ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C40 SRES3]
C42. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬a2 ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C41,57 MRES1]
C43. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬Kc¬lj ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C42,60 MRES1]
C44. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬Kc¬lw ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C43,47 MRES1]
C45. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C44,45 MRES1]
C46. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C45,50 MRES1]
C47. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬a4) [C46,63 MRES1]
C48. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬Kcgc) [C47,66 MRES1]
C49. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬d4) [C48,68 MRES1]
C50. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4) [C49,65 MRES1]
C51. true ⇒ (¬t2 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4) [C50,52 MRES1]
C52. t1 ⇒ © (¬d ∨ ¬d3 ∨ ¬d4) [C51,43 SRES2]
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C54. (t1 ∧ a ∧ a3) ⇒ ©¬d4 [C53,64 SRES1]
C55. (t1 ∧ a ∧ a3 ∧ a4) ⇒ © false [C54,67 SRES1]
C56. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C55 SRES3]
C57. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨ ¬Kc¬lc ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C56,50 MRES1]
C58. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨ ¬a3 ∨ ¬a4) [C57,23 MRES1]
C59. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬a4) [C58,63 MRES1]
C60. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨ ¬a4) [C59,19 MRES1]
C61. true ⇒ (¬t1 ∨ ¬Kcgc) [C60,66 MRES1]
C62. true ⇒ ¬t1 [C61,20 MRES1]
C63. t0 ⇒ © false [C62,18 SRES2]
C64. true ⇒ ¬t0 [C63 SRES3]
C65. start ⇒ false [C64,17 IRES1]
It is Jane’s turn next. Jane can only stop Catherine winning if she makes the (correct)
suggestion “lead piping and Professor Plum” to which both Catherine and Wendy say no.
In this case we can deduce that ©©©©Kj(lm ∧ bm) similarly to the above, i.e., Jane
wins the game and can make the correct accusation “lead piping and Professor Plum”. If
Jane does not use this suggestion whilst she may gain additional information about the
whereabouts of one or more cards she cannot correctly deduce the murderer and murder
weapon. Other suggestions that Jane could make are “Miss Scarlett and spanner” or “Col.
Mustard and lead piping” or “Prof. Plum and revolver” for example.
The turn then passes to Catherine. As at time three Catherine knew the murderer and
murder weapon Catherine will still know this at time five and can make the relevant accu-
sation, i.e., we could also prove that ©©©©©Kc(lm ∧ bm).
Finally, to give a simple illustration of the use of the temporal resolution rule (TRES) we
prove that from time one onwards Catherine knows that Miss Scarlett is not the murderer,
i.e.,
© Kc¬rm
Again we negate and write
©♦¬Kc¬rm
into normal form. As previously we reuse the propositions t0 and t1 to obtain the following
where n3 is a new proposition and apply resolution to these clauses.
C66. t1 ⇒ ♦n3
C67. true ⇒ ¬n3 ∨ ¬Kc¬rm
C68. true ⇒ ¬n3 ∨ ¬Kcrc [C67,13 MRES4]
C69. true ⇒ ¬n3 ∨ ¬d3 [C68,65 MRES1]
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C71. a3 ⇒ ©¬n3 [C69,64 SRES2]
C72. a3 ⇒ ©a3 [C70,64 SRES2]
Clauses C71 and C72 can be used to apply the temporal resolution rule as they give the
loop formula
a3 ⇒ © ¬n3.
When resolved with clause C66 we obtain the resolvent
t1 ⇒ ¬a3Wn3
(not in normal form) which is translated into normal form as follows where wn3 is a new
proposition.
C73. true ⇒ ¬t1 ∨ n3 ∨ ¬a3
C74. true ⇒ ¬t1 ∨ n3 ∨wn3
C75. wn3 ⇒ © (n3 ∨ ¬a3)
C76. wn3 ⇒ © (n3 ∨wn3)
The proof continues as follows
C77. true ⇒ ¬t1 ∨ ¬Kcrc ∨ ¬a3 [C73,C68 MRES1]
C78. true ⇒ ¬t1 ∨ ¬Kcrc [C77,63 MRES1]
C79. true ⇒ ¬t1 [C78,19 MRES1]
C80. t0 ⇒ © false [C79,18 SRES2]
C81. true ⇒ ¬t0 [C80 SRES3]
C82. start ⇒ false [C81,17 IRES1]
7. Discussion
In this section we consider issues relating to the specification and verification of Cluedo
using KLn. In general terms this seems to be a suitable logic because Cluedo involves
reasoning about knowledge over time. KLn is decidable and the complexity of the validity
problem for KLn is PSPACE [10] hence we can use a suitable decision procedure for this
logic (such as temporal resolution) to ascertain valid formulae.
Our first comment is that the logic KLn does not allow common knowledge. That is,
we do not explicitly allow a common knowledge operator in KLn syntax. We note that
the normal form we use, however utilises the ∗ operator. Thus writing, for example,
true ⇒ (rm ∨ gm ∨ ym ∨ bm) directly into the normal form (i.e., it is in the scope of the∗ operator) captures the global truth that either Miss Scarlett or Rev. Green or Col.
Mustard or Prof. Plum is the murderer, i.e., it is common knowledge at every moment.
However, when describing actions in the game in Section 4, for example, at a particular
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statement becomes common knowledge. So for example to specify, “at time two Wendy
answers she doesn’t hold Miss Scarlett or the lead piping” we would like to write some-
thing like t2 ⇒ C(¬rw ∧ ¬lw) where t2 is a new proposition which holds at time two and
C is the common knowledge operator. Note, trying to write this as true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬rw
and true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬lw does not help. To see this take a timeline f , where t2 holds say
at time u, 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= t2, then 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= ¬rw and 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= ¬lw to satisfy
〈M,(f,u)〉 |= true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨¬rw and 〈M,(f,u)〉 |= true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨¬lw . However take any
(f ′, u′) such that ((f,u), (f ′, u′)) ∈ Ri for some i and 〈M,(f ′, u′)〉 |= ¬t2. Then to sat-
isfy 〈M,(f ′, u′)〉 |= true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬rw and 〈M,(f ′, u′)〉 |= true ⇒ ¬t2 ∨ ¬lw we could
have 〈M,(f ′, u′)〉 |= rw and 〈M,(f ′, u′)〉 |= lw which does not capture the notion that
(¬rw ∧ ¬lw) is common knowledge.
Thus, to specify such statements we may have been better off allowing common knowl-
edge in our language, i.e., maybe we have chosen a language that is not sufficiently
expressive. However, allowing common knowledge into the language, the complexity of
the validity problem increases from PSPACE for KLn to EXPTIME [10] and we would
have to adapt the proof method used here to allow common knowledge (or use a differ-
ent proof method). Instead, with the approach we give here, we must explicitly include a
sufficient depth of modal operators in the specification of “common knowledge” axioms if
we want to reason about knowledge. To determine this sufficient depth we must look at the
maximum nesting of Ki operators in the statement we are required to prove, ignoring ad-
jacent pairs of Ki operators for the same i as KiKiϕ ≡ Kiϕ in S5. For example if we want
to prove ©KcKj Kwϕ where ϕ doesn’t include any Ki operators we should introduce
our axioms to a depth of three epistemic operators.
Further, regarding the expressiveness of the logic, fusions of temporal and epistemic
logics (as we have here) do not adequately allow us to show how knowledge evolves over
time. Halpern et al. [6,10] consider the temporal epistemic logic synchrony and perfect
recall to describe systems where the agents have access to a global clock and the number
of timelines indistinguishable to an agent, with respect to its epistemic equivalence relation,
does not increase over time. The game Cluedo seems to match this description as the game
progresses in turns or rounds corresponding to the global clock and if a player knows who
is holding a card or has knowledge about other players’ knowledge about who is holding
a card then they know this at all future moments. An axiomatisation for synchrony and
perfect recall can be obtained by adding the axiom Ki©ϕ ⇒ ©Kiϕ to the axioms of
PLTL and S5. Thus if we consider systems the synchrony and perfect recall we could
avoid stating the perfect recall axioms (1) and (2) from Section 4 explicitly, as these are
deducible from the axioms (3) and (4). Resolution and tableau based proof methods for
systems allowing such interactions are given in [16–18]. However this greatly increases the
complexity of the validity problem for the logic to double exponential time for one agent
and non-elementary time for the multi-agent case of synchrony and perfect recall [6,10].
Further, if we allow common knowledge in the language, the complexity of the validity
problem for the multi-agent case of synchrony and perfect recall (common knowledge
doesn’t any add expressiveness in the single agent case) is undecidable [6,10].
Next, concerning the temporal language, in the above example, we have made no
use of the until operator and little use of the always, sometime and unless operators.
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proved that © Kc¬rm followed from the described specification by negating and writing
©♦¬Kc¬rm into the normal form. The always operator is useful for both specification
and verification. We may require the always operator as part of the property to be verified
in examples such as the one given earlier. The sometime operator doesn’t seem to be par-
ticularly useful in the specification of Cluedo but useful in specifying properties we may
like to prove, for example, at sometime now or in the future Catherine knows that Prof.
Plum is the murderer and the lead piping is the murder weapon
♦Kc(lm ∧ bm)
rather than the more specific ©©©©©Kc(lm ∧ bm) suggested in Section 6. Similarly
unless and until don’t seem to be required in the specification of the Cluedo game but may
be useful for specifying more complex properties to be proved.
We have used propositions such as rc to mean Catherine holds Miss Scarlett. Whilst this
means that the intuitive meaning of formulae is easy to understand it also means that we
may have to use more propositions than we actually need and we must have many clauses
of the form
(6)rc ⇒ (¬rw ∧ ¬rj ∧ ¬rm)
which state that if rc holds then rw , rj and rm cannot hold. An alternative (for three players
and the murder cards) would be to use two propositions for each suspect, room and possible
murder weapon (rather than four) to denote who holds each card. For example using just r1
and r2 we could adopt the following meaning:
• if r1 ∧ r2 is true then Catherine holds Miss Scarlett;
• if r1 ∧ ¬r2 is true then Jane holds Miss Scarlett;
• if ¬r1 ∧ r2 is true then Wendy holds Miss Scarlett;
• if ¬r1 ∧ ¬r2 is true then Miss Scarlett is the murderer.
Now we do not require the formulae of the form (6) as it is only possible for one of the
above four formula to hold at any moment. However, in such an exposition, we prefer the
original due to readability.
Finally, we mention the reuse of the propositions t0, t1, t2 etc. In the specification of a
particular Cluedo game we obtain some formulae in the scope of one or more next opera-
tors representing the knowledge after the deal, the knowledge at time two due to a play in
the game etc. Consider the following formulae which represent the conjunction of formu-
lae from the specification and the negation of the property to proved where Xi represent
formulae without temporal operators (which may require additional transformations to be
written into normal form).
X0 ∧ ©X1 ∧ ©©X2 ∧ ©©©X3
From the standard temporal equivalence
(©A∧ ©B) ≡ © (A∧B)
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X0 ∧ ©X1 ∧ © (©X2 ∧ ©©X3)
Now rewriting this into the normal form we rename the whole formula by t0 obtaining
start ⇒ t0
start ⇒ X0
t0 ⇒ ©X1
t0 ⇒ © (©X2 ∧ ©©X3)
where the Xi formulae may also need renaming to fit the SNFK clause structure and the
last clause is not in the correct format. Next we rename ©X2 ∧ ©©X3 as t1 obtaining
start ⇒ t0 t0 ⇒ © t1
start ⇒ X0 t1 ⇒ ©X2
t0 ⇒ ©X1 t1 ⇒ ©©X3
The final formula is not in normal form but we can obtain this by renaming ©X3 by t2 we
obtain
start ⇒ t0 t0 ⇒ © t1
start ⇒ X0 t1 ⇒ ©X2
t0 ⇒ ©X1 t1 ⇒ © t2
t2 ⇒ ©X3
The reuse of the propositions t0, t1 and t2 is justified for these reasons, i.e., we imagine
we rewrite the specification and the negation of the property to be proved into SNFK at
the same time rather than incrementally as we did in Section 4. Note that introducing new
propositions instead (and clauses analogous to start ⇒ t0, t0 ⇒ © t1 etc.) would also work
and we would just require a few additional lines in the respective proofs.
8. Related implementations
Here we mention two Cluedo players’ assistants that have been developed by consider-
ing the knowledge of each move (described previously) and a prototype resolution theorem
prover for the single agent case of KLn.
8.1. Cluedo players’ assistants
A system showing the knowledge of each player’s cards from the perspective of a par-
ticular player (the user) has been developed in [19]. As described in this paper the dice and
position on the board are not implemented. The system is programmed in Java, has a graph-
ical user interface and allows the input of suggestions, cards shown etc. via choice boxes
and buttons. The user’s knowledge relating to the cards of other players are displayed in
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Scarlett or the rope or the ballroom, from player two showing a card in response to the
suggestion “Scarlett with the rope in the ballroom” from another player, “scarlett or rope
or ballroom” is added to the knowledge of player two’s cards. Similarly if the card hall is
shown to the user by player three then “hall” is added to the window for the user’s knowl-
edge about player three’s cards. Players declaring they don’t know any of the three cards in
a suggestion will result in the negation of those cards being added to that player’s window.
New knowledge is inferred by resolution between statements within a particular window
(representing the user’s knowledge about a player). Further, inferences between players’
knowledge is carried out by inferring if (the user knows that) a player holds a particular
card then other players do not.
A window displays the remaining triples that could be the murderer, murder weapon
and room. This is updated as suggestions are made and answered. For example with the
suggestion above that player two has shown a card to another player the triple “scarlett and
rope and ballroom” can be removed from the remaining murder triple possibilities.
Similarly a player’s assistant has also been developed in [20]. This system uses slightly
different rules to the standard rule set. Information is held and updated relating to the
remaining murderer, murder weapon, and room triples; cards known to be held by other
players; and cards known by players not to be the murderer, murder weapon and location.
Information about knowledge is also held. The system has a text-based user interface.
8.2. Resolution theorem prover for temporal logics of knowledge
A prototype resolution based theorem prover for the single agent temporal logic of
knowledge has been developed in Liverpool. Implemented in Prolog this prototype prover
is based on the resolution calculus described in Section 5. This needs expanding to the
multi-agent case before it can be used to automatically prove the examples in Section 6.
Further, heuristics and strategies to apply the respective proof rules would be useful to
reduce the amount of resolution steps carried out that are not required in the particular
proof.
8.3. Resolution theorem provers for temporal logics
The TRP++ system [21,22] is a C++ implementation of the resolution method for PLTL,
i.e., the temporal logic part of the logic described in this paper. Experiments relating to the
performance of TRP++ as compared to other implemented tableau provers for PLTL have
been carried out [23] showing the TRP++ compares favourably to the other implemented
provers. This indicates that applying resolution to the fusion of temporal and epistemic
logics is also plausible.
TeMP [24] is a resolution theorem prover for monodic first order temporal logics. This
is an implementation of the calculus described in [25] which is a mechanisable version
of [26]. We have been using TeMP for practical verification [27], including the proof of
properties of several examples specified in temporal logics of knowledge. Such specifica-
tions are first translated into first order temporal logics by translating the epistemic part
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described in this paper have been automatically verified in this way.
9. Conclusions and related work
9.1. Related work
The properties of, complexity and axiomatisations for temporal logics of knowledge
have been studied, for example, in [6,10,28]. As well as dealing with fusions of the logics
of knowledge and time, i.e., they do not allow (non-trivial) axioms referring to operators
of both knowledge and time, these papers discuss systems with interactions. For example,
systems with synchrony and perfect recall, mentioned in Section 7 are considered, along
with other interactions, with respect to axiomatisations and complexity.
Combinations of modal and temporal logics have been used to specify complex situa-
tions. For example BDI logics [29,30], the fusion of either linear or branching-time (CTL
or CTL*) with the modal logics KD45 for belief, and KD for desire and intention, are used
to specify properties multi-agent systems. Tableau based proof methods are also given for
these logics. Also in the area of multi-agent systems proof methods for a core of the agent
specification logic KARO (knowledge, actions, results opportunities) [31] a complex com-
bination of dynamic logic, and the modal logics of knowledge and wishes (KD) has been
outlined in [32].
The muddy children problem is a well known problem relating to reasoning about
knowledge. The problem is specified using epistemic logics in [6] and is specified and
verified using temporal logics of knowledge in [7].
The specification of Cluedo game actions has been carried out in [13] in a dynamic
epistemic logic (the combination of dynamic logic and a logic of knowledge allowing
common knowledge). Unsurprisingly the knowledge gained from moves in the game is the
same as described in this paper except that the common knowledge resulting from some
moves can be explicitly stated. The focus of [13] is the specification of the knowledge
actions rather than verification. The paper [13] mentions no axiomatisation for the logic
and decidability or proof methods are not discussed.
Reasoning for combinations of PLTL and epistemic logics above been carried out also
using tableau calculi, see for example [33] for combinations for epistemic and belief logics
with PLTL, and [34] for PLTL combined with epistemic logics in the presence of synchrony
and prefect recall or synchrony and no-learning. In this paper we have chosen to use a
resolution based method because many of the axioms required are disjunctions and close
to our normal form. Generally tableaux calculi perform worse than resolution with mainly
disjunctive formulae. Further, as mentioned previously, implementations for the temporal
part of the reasoning have compared favourably to tableau implementations [23]. Model
checking allowing both knowledge and time has been described in [35] and for systems of
perfect recall in [36]. Model checking usually requires two inputs, the model of the system
in question and the property to be checked, usually expressed as a temporal logic formula.
Whilst the formulae we have tried to prove are analogous to the properties to be checked,
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game.
Reasoning in the presence of perfect recall allowing both actions and knowledge in the
situation calculus is considered in [37]. A regression operator is defined such that reasoning
about future situations is reduced to reasoning about the initial situation. That is, there is
reasoning backwards from a situation to its predecessor, following the regression operator,
until we reach the initial situation. The definition of the regression operator is non trivial. At
a high level, the way the reasoning is carried out in the resolution calculus presented here
is similar, i.e., we add extra constraints having derived a contradiction in future moments
and end up with a contradiction in the initial state. For example in Section 6 we showed
©©Kclm followed from the specification at that point. To satisfy clauses 17 and 18,
t0 must hold in the initial state and t1 at time 1. In clause C13, a ∧ t1 ⇒ © false, we
generate a contradiction in the state after where a and t1 hold (at time 2). This generates
the additional constraints in clause C14. After further resolution steps we generate C17,
i.e., t0 ⇒ © false representing a contradiction at moment 1. C18 is then derived which
leads us to clause C19, start ⇒ false, a contradiction in the initial state.
9.2. Conclusions
This paper explores a case study relating to reasoning about knowledge over time. We
have applied temporal logics of knowledge to specify and verify the game Cluedo where
the knowledge of players forms an integral part of the game. We have shown how the
various moves in Cluedo can be specified using temporal logics of knowledge. We have
proved properties of this specification by applying a resolution based calculus for temporal
logics of knowledge. We have considered the suitability of KLn for specifying and verifying
the game Cluedo in Section 7 as well as particular choices made in the specification given
here.
The players’ assistant systems described in Section 8, for example, concentrate on keep-
ing track of the knowledge of who holds which cards. Enhancing these systems to suggest
which card to reveal to an opponent or what to guess as your next suggestion would be
a next step. That is to move towards a system that plays Cluedo rather than an player’s
assistant. A simple way to show what card to reveal to an opponent (so as to help her the
least) might be to show a card that the user knows the opponent knows the user holds al-
ready. This requires reasoning about knowledge and would require additional nesting of
knowledge operators to be recorded.
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